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COMMENTARY: WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS IN
THE MARYLAND WORKPLACE OF 2007 AND 2027*
MARLEY S. WEISS**
The papers presented in this symposium have provided us with
a rich body of investigation into the range of issues confronting the
working women of the State of Maryland, and legal responses thereto.
In this commentary, I will situate the matters already addressed in
depth by others within the broader framework of legal issues affecting
women workers, not only in Maryland but elsewhere. I will outline
inter-relationships among these issues as well. I will conclude by
offering some thoughts on priorities and strategies for law reform in
this state targeted to move Maryland women forward.
I. OBSTACLES TO WOMEN'S EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE
A list of the key legal, social, and economic obstacles to full
equality for women in the workplace and the labor market might
include occupational segregation, both horizontal and vertical; wage
discrimination and its corollary of devaluation of predominantly
female work; pregnancy discrimination; obstacles to success for
women related to their disproportionate shouldering of home and
family burdens; sexual harassment on the job; the design of the
unemployment insurance system; and the design of employee fringe
benefit plans. Far from being watertight compartments, however, each
of these areas is intertwined with the others.
Dr. Vicky Lovell's work highlights the combination of
occupational segregation and lower pay for Maryland women.' In
Maryland, 2 as well as throughout the U.S., 3 female workers average
Copyright © 2009 by Marley S. Weiss.
* Several significant changes in statute and case law have occurred since the initial preparation
of this article. Every effort has been made to incorporate pertinent updating material, although
in depth treatment of 2008 and 2009 developments here is not possible.
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I wish to express my thanks to
Professor Margaret Johnson for her leading role in organizing the symposium; to the Women's
Law Center of Maryland, University of Baltimore School of Law, and University of Maryland
School of Law for supporting it; and to Samantha Kravitz and the editors of this Journal for
their hard work in bringing this collection of papers to publication.
1. Vicky Lovell, Evaluating Policy Solutions to Sex-Based Pay Discrimination:
Women Workers, Lawmakers, and Cultural Change, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 45 (2009).
2. See VICKY LOVELL & OLGA SOROKINA, REPORT TO THE MARYLAND EQUAL PAY
COMMISSION (July 19, 2006), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/MD_payequityreport.pdf,
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lower earnings than men. This remains true even taking into account
factors such as hours worked, occupation, and industry. The
distribution of women workers in industries, occupations, and jobs is
quite different than that of their male peers, and is inter-related both as
cause and effect in the gender-earnings gap.4 The wage gap closed
significantly between 1960 and 2006 as the ratio of women's to men's
wages for full-time workers grew from 60.7 percent to 77 percent. On
the other hand, progress has stalled for the past five years, during
which time the ratio has essentially remained unchanged.
Standard comparison figures, holding constant for variables
such as full-time employment, occupation, and sector severely
understate the depth of the earnings gap in women's lives. This
standard methodology erases the compounding effect of the key
gender-correlated factors, such as semi-voluntary part-time work,
constrained choice to engage in intermittent labor force participation,
wage depression in traditionally female fields, and the cumulative
wage earning consequences of these disadvantages across a working
lifetime. A recent national study concluded that "women workers in
the prime working ages of 26 to 59 make only 38 percent of what
prime-age men earn across the 15 years [covered] in the study.",6 In
addition, "[a]mong those prime-age adults who work every year and
average less than $15,000 annually, more than 90 percent are
women." 7 Almost two-thirds of all minimum wage workers are
8
women.
Maryland state profile chart, available at http://www.iwpr.org/States2004/MD.htm (analyzing
Maryland data); AMY CAIAZZA, ET AL., THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE STATES: WOMEN'S
ECONOMIC STATUS IN THE STATES: WIDE DISPARITIES BY RACE, ETHNICITY, AND REGION
(2004), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/R260.pdf (for comparative data on all the states).
3. JUDY GOLDBERG DEY & CATHERINE HILL, BEHIND THE PAY GAP (2007), available at
http://www.aauw.org/research/upload/behindPayGap.pdf, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY
RESEARCH, FACT SHEET: THE GENDER WAGE RATIO: WOMEN'S AND MEN'S EARNINGS (updated
Aug. 2008) [hereinafter THE GENDER WAGE RATIO], available at
http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C350.pdf (compiled and analyzed recent national data).
4. See STEPHEN J. ROSE & HEIDI 1. HARTMANN, STILL A MAN'S LABOR MARKET: THE
LONG TERM EARNINGS GAP, iii (2004), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C355.pdf (for an
excellent presentation of the factors and their interactions).
5. See THE GENDER WAGE RATIO, supra note 3; INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY
RESEARCH, THE GENDER WAGE GAP: PROGRESS OF THE 1980s FAILS TO CARRY THROUGH
(November 2003), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C353.pdf, CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT
ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH
INS. COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 II (Aug. 2006), available at
http://www.heartland.org/custom/semod_policybot/pd f/19676.pdf.
6. ROSE & HARTMANN, supra note 4, at iii.
7. Id.
8. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF MIN.
WAGE WORKERS, 2005, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2005tbls.htm.
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Disparities in level of educational attainment is not at fault,
despite the supposed shift into a global economy in which knowledge
workers command a high wage premium over others. Higher
proportions of women than men are completing their college and
higher level university degrees. 9 In Maryland, as of 2000, 83.5 percent
of men and 84.1 percent of women had a high school diploma; a
modestly higher percentage of men (33.5 percent) compared to women
(29.6 percent) had a bachelor's degree or higher final diploma,
although women were gaining ground rapidly.' 0 However, women's
advanced qualifications are less likely than those of men to be in
higher paying technical fields, and more likely to be in heavily female
specialties.'1
Intentional discrimination-that is, disparate treatment of
women-figures prominently here. Some of this differential is
attributable to straightforward, intentional gender discrimination in the
wage setting process by employers. Companies may pay women less
because their labor market position is weaker, or because they fail to
negotiate salary as aggressively as their male counterparts, or because
management still harbors traditional notions of men working as family
breadwinners and women working to supplement the family's income.
Some of it is the result of subconscious gender discrimination; the
woman worker may not be perceived by her boss as equally valuable
compared to her similarly situated male counterpart, even if all
objective indicators suggest that they are identical.
Some of the wage differential is the by-product of intentional
gender discrimination in job assignment and promotion that, in the
aggregate, contributes significantly to horizontal and vertical
occupational segregation. By horizontal segregation, I am referring to
a form of gender role stereotyping which leads employers to resist
assigning women to jobs which are traditionally and overwhelmingly
held by men. Peer sexual harassment plays a part here as well, since
male coworkers may resist intrusion of one or a few women into a
male working environment. The men may create a hostile working
environment as a means of driving the intruding women out. Vertical
occupational segregation, often labeled the "glass ceiling," also causes
9. U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, One-Third of Young Women Have Bachelor's
Degrees (Jan. 10, 2008) available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/education/01 1196.html.
10. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARYLAND: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE POPULATION
25 YEARS AND OVER: 1940 TO 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/phct4 I/MD.pdf.
11. See Rose & Hartmann, supra note 4, at iv, 13-15.
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women's earnings to be lower than those of men.' 2 Stereotypes and
preconceptions about women, as well as concerns about resistance of
male subordinates, often deter employers from promoting women
above a certain level, especially when the workforce they will be
managing is heavily male. 3
The gender-earnings gap also is partly the result of an amalgam
of factors other than intentional gender discrimination by employers.
The disproportionate concentration of women in government and non-
profit organizations, which tend to pay lower wages than private, for-
profit companies, contributes to the disparity. So, too, does the pattern
of intermittent labor force participation, and of part-time rather than
full-time work, which is more common among women than men. 14 As
of 2007, 89.5 percent of working age men worked full-time, but only
75.3 percent of working aFe women did so.' 5 Two of every three part-
time workers are women.
"Contingent" or "atypical" work of all types tends to be paid at
lower rates than comparable "standard," full-time work in a permanent
position. Even when women's children are in school or grown, and
their working time availability resembles that of men, career-
dampening effects may persist from earlier years of part-time or
intermittent work, causing fewer promotions and lower earnings. 17
Moreover, women in Maryland, as elsewhere, tend to be
disproportionately employed in small and medium-sized businesses.
This is partly a result of gender discrimination in the labor market as
well as other labor market factors tending to exclude them from non-
female stereotyped employment with large businesses. There are many
consequences of women's disproportionate employment in smaller
firms. These businesses tend to pay lower wages, provide fewer fringe
benefits, and have much higher closure and bankruptcy rates than
Fortune 500 companies.
Finally, women tend to be concentrated in predominantly
female occupations and industries. This occupational segregation has
repeatedly been shown to be strongly correlated with undervaluation
of the predominantly female jobs compared to those of men.18 The
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id.
14. Id. at iii.
15. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF WOMEN AND MEN
IN 2007, available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/Qf-ESWM07.htm.
16. Id.
17. See ROSE & HARTMANN, supra note 4, at iii.
18. See, e.g., id. at iv.
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cumulative effect of these realities on women's career prospects
accounts for a significant portion of gender disparities in all aspects of
employment, remuneration, and benefits.
The papers of Cynthia Calvert 19 and Michael Hayes 20 address
some of the consequences for women in the labor force of women's
disproportionate undertaking of the burdens of home and family
responsibilities. 2 1 This area, too, is compounded of several intertwined
factors. Discrimination against women based on stereotypes about
their childbearing and family care roles 22 underlies much of the
intentional gender discrimination in hiring, job assignment, promotion,
and pay. Even women willing and able to conform to the full-time-plus
worker model are often perceived, based on their gender, as less likely
to do so.
Equally important, many workplace policies, practices, and
structures are based on the traditional, implicitly male, full-time
breadwinner worker model. This image of a worker presumes that his
primary focus in life is his job and workplace, and deletes any
competing caretaking duties from the picture. Employment policies of
this sort are occasionally designed as a means of excluding women
from a workplace. More commonly, however, they are adopted or
maintained despite their foreseeable, disparate impact upon the
significant percentage of women workers who in fact assume the lion's
share of family responsibilities. Although in theory these practices
may be subject to challenge on a disparate impact basis under federal
and Maryland equal employment law, or on other grounds, very few
such systemic discrimination cases actually have been litigated.2 3 It is
perhaps noteworthy that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) guidance on discrimination against caregivers
confines itself to disparate treatment.
24
The continuing assumption by a majority of women of the
greater portion of the burden of family caretaking tasks combines with
19. Cynthia Thomas Calvert, The New Sex Discrimination: Family Responsibilities, 9
U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 33 (2009).
20. Michael J. Hayes, Employment Leave Issues, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER
& CLASS 19 (2009).
21. See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 1-2 (2000).
22. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with
Caregiving Responsibilities (No. 915.002) (May 23, 2007) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement
Guidance], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
23. See, e.g., Joan Williams and Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 77,
122-23, 134 (2003).
24. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 22.
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the implicit male non-caretaking worker norm to reinforce
occupational segregation, unequal remuneration, and devaluation of
predominantly female occupations. Actual or expected family
responsibility roles pressure many women into intermittent paid
employment, part-time work, or work in predominantly female
occupations or industries. These are work situations in which the
implicit male breadwinner employee model is less likely to be
prevalent and to influence workplace norms and arrangements.
Women become school teachers so they can be home after school to
take care of their children. Women enter nursing because hospital
employers have accommodated their heavily female workforces by
organizing a variety of more flexible work schedules, including part-
time work compensated on a pro rata par with full-time work. Women
lawyers enter government service to feel confident that they can leave
after a normal workday. Women attorneys leave litigation law firm
positions for corporate house counsel jobs to escape billable hour
requirements, which mandate sixty or seventy hour work weeks.
Instead, women lawyers favor jobs with a regularized, forty hour work
week schedule, which dovetails with their day care or elder care
arrangements. Women doctors enter specialties such as pediatrics, with
relatively stable hours, rather than orthopedic surgery, in which for the
first ten or fifteen years after completing their training they would be
on call almost 24/7. Of course, the poorest women and those lacking
skills and educational credentials find themselves mired in dead end,
minimum wage jobs, where even a forty hour workweek is insufficient
to maintain a basic standard of living.
An important feature of the working time issue for women, as
it relates to their constrained employment choices, is the imperative
need many of them have for regularity, as well as flexibility on their
terms rather than those of the employer. Those relying on day care or
elder care providers are especially vulnerable to job loss or exclusion
from employment when an employer insists upon employee
"flexibility." Flexibility from the employee side, such as the need to
take off a sick day to go to the doctor, or a personal business day to go
to her child's school for a parent-teacher conference, is inherently at
odds with the employer's need for regularity, or at least some control
over the employee's presence, and vice versa. Scheduling of work on a
rotating shift, or obligating employees to perform mandatory overtime
whenever extra work is needed by the employer, operates to exclude
workers with conflicting child or day care arrangements or other
family responsibilities from employment.
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There is an irony to the disproportionate concentration of
women in government jobs as well as in small and medium size
enterprises. These businesses tend to be excluded from coverage under
federal, and to a lesser extent, state laws whose purpose is to respond
to gender discrimination in employment, as well as to the unbalanced
gender allocation of home and family work. Many labor and
employment laws set thresholds based on number of employees,
number of employee hours worked, or dollar volume turnover of the
business, in defining the "employer" covered by the statute. The higher
the threshold for coverage, the greater the extent to which the statute
itself disproportionately excludes women workers. More heed,
therefore, should be paid to whether any small employer exclusion is
really warranted, and even when it is, to minimizing the exclusion.
The federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 199325 threshold
of fifty employees 26 is a particularly egregious example. The law
permits workers to take up to twelve weeks within a twelve month
period of unpaid leave of absence, when the leave is necessitated
because of the worker's own serious health condition, or because of
the serious health condition of a child, parent, or spouse, or to care for
a newborn or newly adopted child or a newly placed foster child. The
employee is assured of the right to return to her original or an
equivalent position. She also is guaranteed continuation of any
employer-provided group health insurance.27 The law was proposed in
part to respond to the problem of facially gender neutral employment
policies, which permitted so few unpaid absences that virtually every
pregnant woman would lose her job for excessive absenteeism. 28 Yet a
significant portion of its targeted beneficiary group is excluded as
employees of small and medium sized businesses.
Several other areas to which the papers have devoted less
attention should be mentioned in this overview of working women's
problems. The first is unemployment insurance. Many aspects of the
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2009).
26. Id. at § 2611 (4)(A)(i).
27. Id. at §§ 2612(a)(1) and 2614(a)(1). Special rules now apply to those with family
members serving in the armed forces. See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
28. See, e.g., Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor and Indus., 685 F.2d 1088, 1089,
1091 (9th Cir. 1982) (employer permitted no absences whatsoever during first year of
employment and fired worker when her pregnancy-related illness necessitated her absence in
violation of Montana statute, which required employer to allow reasonable leave of absence
for pregnancy; employer's challenge to Montana law as preempted by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act was dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction); see also Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (holding that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978 does not preempt a state statute that requires employers to provide leave of absence and
reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy).
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unemployment benefits system are skewed in favor of the full-time,
permanent, implicitly male worker model. 29  These elements
disproportionately disadvantage those who work intermittently or part-
time in qualifying for benefit eligibility as well as reducing the amount
of benefits to which they are entitled. 30 Even worse, women may be
deemed unavailable to work, and hence disqualified, because of
pregnancy-related disabilities, or because of working time or
commuting limitations connected with child care or elder care.
Maryland, for example, expressly makes voluntarily quitting a job to
accompany a spouse to a new location or to join a spouse in a new
location a disqualifying factor for which a "valid circumstance [does
not] exist," precluding eligibility for unemployment benefits. 3' The
disqualification will persist until the worker has been reemployed and
has earned wages of at least fifteen times her weekly benefit. 32 I will
reserve further discussion of this topic for another day, however, since
it largely operates in the background of the labor market rather than at
its center.
Professor Hayes' work notes special problems suffered by
workers who are victims of domestic violence, a class composed
29. See Vicky Lovell, The Unemployment Insurance Modernization Act: Improving UI
Equity and Adequacy for Women (Testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee,
Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support, Hearing on Modernizing
Unemployment Insurance to Reduce Barriers for Jobless Workers), (Sept. 19, 2007), available
at www.iwpr.org/pdf/LovellUlTestimony.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); VICKY LOVELL, FACT
SHEET: WOMEN AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: OUTDATED RULES DENY BENEFITS THAT
WORKERS NEED AND HAVE EARNED, (Jan. 2008) available at http://www.iwpr.org/index.cfm.
See generally Martin H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-
Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131, 133, 173 (1996).
30. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-903(a) (West 2009) (requiring a benefits
claimant to be able to work, available to work, and actively seeking work). The Maryland
Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Division of Unemployment Insurance
formerly administratively interpreted this to require that "[alt the time you file your claim for
unemployment insurance benefits, you must be able and available for full-time work without
restrictions... " MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION, WHAT
YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN MARYLAND 2 (2007), available at
http://www.dllr.state.md.us/employment/clmtguide. However, while this article was in press,
the 2009 Maryland General Assembly amended the law to insert § 8-903(a)(3), allowing a
part-time worker who is able to work, available to work part-time, and actively seeking part-
time work, in a labor market with "reasonable demand" for part-time work, to qualify for
unemployment benefits, provided the worker has worked a sufficient number of hours within
the statutory base period. 2009 Md. ALS 5.
31. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8-1001(a)(1), 8-1001(d)(2) (West 2009). In 2008,
the legislature added a modest exception, § 8-1001(c)(l)(iii), for spouses of armed services
members, civilian military employees, and military contractors whose spouses' mandatory
relocation entailed relocation, hence job termination, for the spouse. 2008 Md. ALS 669.
32. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-l001(e)(2)(ii) (West 2009).
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primarily of women.33 When women workers are abused at home, they
may become victims of discrimination at work. Their employers may
become leery of the violence spilling over into the workplace, as well
as concerned about the victim's likely distraction from her job duties.
This may render them eager to seize an opportunity to terminate the
employment relationship. If the domestic violence leads to injury and
medical bills, the increased employee benefit costs add more reason
still for the employer to seek to terminate the employee. The employee
who suffers a serious health condition as a result of domestic violence
has a right to take unpaid leave under the FMLA, provided the
employee is lucky enough to work at a larger employer exceeding the
fifty employee threshold. Even then, however, she may have trouble
establishing that the condition is sufficiently "serious," which depends
on showing that her medical condition makes her unable to perform
the functions of her job.34
A discussion of workplace issues of particular importance to
women would be incomplete without mention of sexual harassment.
Academic research suggests that this problem remains ubiquitous in
American workplaces, and that the huge majority of cases involve
male harassment of female co-workers and subordinates; there is no
reason to believe that those in Maryland are any different. Besides
requiring legal intervention because of its direct consequences upon
victims, sexual harassment is often used "to keep women in their
place," by male superiors, co-workers, or even subordinates intending
to make the woman's situation on the job so miserable that she will
leave. Sexual harassment therefore plays a very important role in
reinforcing occupational segregation, both vertical and horizontal,
which in turn is a major factor underlying the gender earnings gap.
All of the problems identified above are amenable to state
legislative response, not in the sense that legislation can fix everything,
but in the sense that they are within the sphere of competence of the
Maryland legislature. Two others, however, should be noted here, as to
which Maryland authority is limited or precluded entirely. The first is
employee fringe benefits. The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)3 has largely preempted this field. There are many ways
in which employee fringe benefit plans tend to be structured to the
disadvantage of women. Of particular note is the frequent exclusion,
rather than pro rata inclusion, of part-time workers in pension and
health insurance plans, or the setting of an hours per week or per year
33. Hayes, supra note 20, at 20-23.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(I)(D) (2000).
35. Id. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
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threshold that excludes most of the women workers. 36 Pension plans
often perpetuate the effects of past sex discrimination into the present,
particularly pre-Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) discrimination
in the treatment of pregnancy-related leave, excluding pregnancy and
maternity leaves but not other forms of medical leave from service
credit calculations in computing pension benefit accrual. The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, has held that since the initial disparate
treatment of pregnancy-related leave was lawful at the time
committed, retention of this failure to allow credited service in current
pension benefit calculations is not subject to challenge.3 7 Section 514
of ERISA, 38 however, preempts state efforts to regulate employee
benefit plans, so most of this cannot be addressed within the
framework of Maryland law.
There is a special exception to ERISA preemption for state
laws regulating insurance, 39 which does allow states to mandate
36. See generally Lois SHAW & CATHERINE HILL, THE GENDER GAP IN PENSION
COVERAGE: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 14-15 (May 15, 2001), available at
www.iwpr.org/pdf/e507.pdf.
37. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009). The Hulteen Court's reasoning is
predicated on two points: First, the assumption that the pregnancy discrimination was lawful
when committed, and second, on the characterization of the pension accrual scheme as part of
a "bona fide seniority system" protected from challenge under § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (2000), unless "adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose." Title VII §
706(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(2). The Court found inapplicable the Ledbetter amendment
permitting claims of compensation discrimination "when a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits,
or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other
practice," Title VII § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), as amended by Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009 (LLFPA), Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5-6. The Court reasoned that since the PDA
had not yet been enacted when the women were initially denied service credits for time spent
on pregnancy leave, the plaintiffs had not been "affected by application of a[n unlawfully]
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice." It is quite possible, however, that
some plaintiff class members could have shown that the duration of their pregnancy and
maternity leaves were prolonged by either being forced onto a leave of absence before they
were disabled, or being pressured not to return to work after delivery for a longer period than
mandated by their personal physicians. These forms of disparate treatment unduly "burdening"
pregnant workers were held to be subject to Title VII sex discrimination challenge by the
Court in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), a pre-PDA decision. In the view of
other commentators as well as this author, such originally unlawful employment practices may
provide the foundation under the LLFPA to a valid present challenge to current effects in the
form of lowered compensation, presumably also including pension benefits. See, e.g., Charles
A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499 (2010).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
39. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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elements of group health insurance. However, that exception is
inapplicable if the employer self-insures,40 which they increasingly do.
Some group health plans exclude female contraception,
abortion, and sterilization. The legality of excluding female
contraception remains contested under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 4 1 amending the prohibition against sex discrimination of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196442 to forbid discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.43
Maryland was the first state to utilize its power to mandate
prescription contraceptive coverage under its authority to regulate
insurance, adopting an exemplary bill in 1998 which requires
employers who provide prescription drug coverage as part of their
employee fringe benefit plans to include coverage of prescription
contraceptives and to cover them at the same co-pay or other cost
imposed on other types of prescriptions. Twenty-three other states
have since followed suit, and three additional states have interpreted
their antidiscrimination laws to impose an equivalent requirement
upon employers.44
A final area which affects women, along with all workers,
deserves mention here: the ability of workers to organize a labor union
and bargain collectively with their employers. Much ink has been
spilled outlining the inadequacies of the present regime under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),45 widely regarded as having
become dysfunctional in the seventy plus years since its inception. As
the unionized share of the private sector labor force in the United
States drops to levels not seen since before the Great Depression, the
significance of the extraordinary difficulty of unionizing and
40. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
42. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
43. Id. § 2000e(k) (however, the exclusion of abortion coverage is expressly permitted
by the PDA).
44. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(a) (West 2002). For a survey of the states, see
generally NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LAW IN YOUR STATE:
KNOW YOUR RIGHTS-USE YOUR RIGHTS: A CONSUMER GUIDE (Aug. 2007), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/ConCovStateGuideAugust2007.pdf; GUTTMACHER INST., STATE
POLICIES IN BRIEF-INSURANCE COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTIVES (Apr. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibICC.pdf. See, e.g., Women's Health and
Wellness Act, N.Y. INS. LAW § 322 1(1) (McKinney 2008), N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)
(McKinney 2007), upheld as constitutional in Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v.
Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468-69 (N.Y. 2006); Women's Contraception Equity Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2000) & CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2005)
(upheld as constitutional in Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d
67, 73-74, 94 (Cal. 2004)).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
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bargaining in this country should be noted. In those traditionally
female jobs in which substantial gains in wages and benefits have been
attained over the past three decades, particularly teaching and nursing,
unionization has clearly been a major influence. A union is the only
vehicle under American law through which workers can have a real
voice in setting their wages, hours, and terms of employment, all of
which are otherwise set by the employer acting unilaterally. In
addition, having union representation provides workers with an
important vehicle for redressing workplace grievances without having
to stand up individually against the employer. Studies indicate that
women are especially reluctant to press claims for sexual harassment
or other forms of sex discrimination in employment. The presence of a
union can facilitate advancing such claims and can reassure the worker
that she has the added protection against retaliatory discharge of the
"just cause" provision constraining termination of employment in
nearly all collective bargaining agreements. She also can rely on the
support of the union in representing her during the grievance
procedure. The flaws of the NLRA, however, are largely immune to
response at the state level; preemption of state law regarding the right
to organize and bargain collectively in the private sector precludes
inclusion of useful measures on any agenda of Maryland legislative
reforms on behalf of women.
Many of the problems diagnosed above, as well as in the
papers presented in the symposium, involve forms of gender
discrimination already unlawful under present Maryland and federal
law. It seems clear that the requirement of non-discriminatory
treatment of women employees is under-enforced. Moreover, as the
federal courts have become increasingly hostile to claims of
discrimination of all stripes, a sound state law with strong enforcement
and remedies becomes ever more important.
As Professor Deborah Eisenberg's paper points out, the recent
amendment to Maryland law to provide for a private right of action in
state circuit court, along with a jury trial and compensatory or punitive
damages, is a major step forward.46 The Maryland legislative
compromise adopted caps on the amount of damages recoverable,
based on the size of the employer. These maxima range from $50,000
46. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Opening the Doors to the Local Courthouse:
Maryland's New Private Right of Action for Employment Discrimination, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 7 (2009).
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to $300,000, 4 7 an unfortunate emulation of the federal model enacted
in the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1991.48
Needless to say, women workers are disproportionately
concentrated in smaller employers. Thus, a woman suffering from an
act of racial discrimination similar to that suffered by a man with
regards to promotion would be more likely to work in a smaller firm.
As such, she would be likely to recover a lower amount of damages as
a remedy for the violation. Moreover, the Maryland amendment took
the federal caps one step further, and applied them to all covered
grounds of discrimination, while the federal law left in place the
preexisting remedy for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which imposes no ceiling on damages.
49
The revised Maryland law does represent significant
advancement in several other respects, which should be mentioned.
First, the Maryland damage remedy as well as the right to trial by jury
appears to apply to all claims of unlawful sex discrimination under the
Maryland private right of action, including claims of disparate impact
as well as claims of disparate treatment. The 1991 Civil Rights Act
amended Title VII remedies only as to claims of "intentional
discrimination" or disparate treatment, and not as to claims of
disparate impact. Disparate impact cases involve claims that a facially
neutral employment policy or practice had a disproportionately
adverse effect on women as compared to men, and was not justified as
job related and a business necessity. Maryland law now affords a
superior remedy for these kinds of violations. Federal claims of
disparate impact have dropped precipitously compared to claims of
disparate treatment, in part because the availability of a jury trial and
compensatory damages encourages plaintiffs' counsel to plead cases as
alleging intentional discrimination. Leveling up the remedial
possibilities may encourage plaintiffs' counsel to bring disparate
impact cases under Maryland law, which affords a better prospect of
addressing systemic discrimination.
Even where the new Maryland law goes no further than the
federal law, it will provide victims of gender discrimination in
employment with a very valuable choice of forum. Many plaintiffs
may find it more advantageous to litigate in Maryland state courts
rather than the federal courts. The new Maryland legislation will
47. H.B. 1034, 2006 Leg., 42 1st Sess. (Md. 2006).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 1981a(b) (2002). 42 U.S.C § 1981a(c) provides the right
to a jury trial in cases in which plaintiff seeks compensatory or punitive damages.
49. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T, § 20-1013 (West 2009); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b)(4)
(2002).
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permit plaintiffs preferring the state court venue to file a state court
action pleading only the Maryland statutory allegations, and still be
able to recover a damage remedy. By omitting federal
antidiscrimination law allegations, the Maryland plaintiff will preclude
removal of the case to federal court.
II. SOLUTIONS TO DEFICIENCIES IN PRESENT MARYLAND LAW
Improvement in the status of women in Maryland will probably
entail further revision of Maryland law, and in some cases, federal law.
The reform agenda should focus as much as possible on measures to
achieve improvement in the problem areas of occupational
segregation, wage and benefit disparities, and the constraints in the
labor market imposed on women by their disproportionate share of the
burden of home and family caretaking.
The first priority should be intensified enforcement of existing
bodies of substantive law protecting women workers; primarily this
means employment discrimination and equal pay law, but it also
means family medical leave and other minimum labor standards
legislation. Relatively minor amendments to existing legislation could
significantly improve incentives for compliance by employers. For
example, the caps could be removed on the recently amended private
right of action damage remedies. 50 In addition, employer size
thresholds could be eliminated or at least reduced to increase the
coverage for women of a wide range of statutory protections.
A modest, but significant legislative improvement would be to
eliminate or reduce the threshold for employer coverage under
Maryland equal employment law, which at present requires fifteen or
more employees, identical to that of Title VII.5" The threshold is
already down to one employee in Prince George's, Montgomery, and
Baltimore Counties, and Howard County has set the minimum at five.
In practice, reducing the statewide statutory threshold would simply
equalize the coverage throughout the less urbanized portions of the
52state. Because so many small employers are already accustomed to
the lower threshold based on county code, opposition ought to be
50. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T, §§ 20-1009(b)(3), 20-1013(3)(e) (West 2009).
51. Id. § 20-601(d)(I)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
52. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE § 27-6 (2007); BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD. CODE
§ 29-2-201 (c)(I)(i) (2003); PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD. CODE § 2-186(a)(5) (2003);
HOWARD COUNTY, MD. CODE § 12.208(d). The private right of action provided for under each
of these county laws is authorized pursuant to MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T, §§ 20-1202, 20-
1203 (West 2009). See Edwards Sys. Tech. v. Corbin, 841 A.2d 845 (Md. 2004).
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muted. Numerous other states provide for coverage of small and even
micro-employers. Alaska, for example, defines any person employing
one or more employees as a covered employer; California covers
employers with five or more employees.54
The present state of affairs is particularly unfortunate. The
recent amendment of Maryland law to allow employees directly to file
their own civil lawsuits in state circuit court in response to workplace
discrimination has retained the equivalent of a small claims procedure.
An employee with a modest claim, who is very likely unable to obtain
private counsel, can still litigate her case before the Human Relations
Commission. Should the Commission then find the claim to have
merit, the Commission can pursue it on the worker's behalf in court.
Many of the smallest claims, however, will be those for failure to hire
in the high turnover, low wage labor market, or for failure to promote
where the incremental wage increase is small. These cases are likely to
arise among smaller employers, many of whom will fall short of the
fifteen-employee threshold, leaving the Commission without
jurisdiction and the employee without a remedy.
On the other hand, if the worker is discriminatorily terminated,
she will have a Maryland common law tort claim on the basis of the
employer's violation of the clear statutory mandate of Maryland law
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex. 55 Such a
tort claim would permit recovery of damages without regard to the
caps which would apply to employees of larger employers. Maryland
recognizes only a common law cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. The state courts are highly
unlikely to recognize a tort claim for wrongful failure to hire, promote,
or transfer in violation of that same public policy against employment
discrimination, even though the dignitary insult may be equally as
great. Covering all Maryland employers would ensure the possibility
to all employees of full vindication of the antidiscrimination principle
while eliminating this incongruity.
Better enforcement of Maryland employment discrimination
law and higher levels of voluntary employer compliance are already
facilitated by the new provisions for jury trials and awards of
compensatory and punitive damages. Removal of the damage caps
would accelerate this effort, but a decision to invest more state
resources into administering and enforcing Maryland's prohibition on
employment discrimination could make an equally substantial
53. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(5) (2007).
54. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926(d) (West 2007).
55. See Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608, 628-29 (Md. 1996).
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difference. Civil procedure clarification to ease requirements for
certification of class actions would also help stimulate an increased
volume of pattern and practice litigation in Maryland, enabling
structural challenges to systemic discrimination by businesses.
Hand in hand with the numerical threshold for employer
coverage goes the definition of the covered employment relationship.
Increasingly, under all bodies of labor and employment law, the
question becomes whether the worker performing the work is
technically an employee of the party for whom the labor is being
performed. Sometimes, it occurs in the guise of a claim that the worker
is herself an independent contractor, often labeled a "consultant." In
other cases, there is a labor supply intermediary, but important
incidents of terms and conditions of employment, particularly on the
job task assignment, supervision, safety requirements, and exposure to
sexual harassment, are controlled not by the labor supply firm-the
putative sole employer-but by the party hiring the work done.
Women would be among those workers particularly benefiting from an
expanded and clarified definition of the employment relationship
covered by Maryland's labor and employment laws. A new
employment relationship definition could reflect the economic realities
of a dependent relationship, rather than being derived from master-
servant vicarious liability law, which was formulated with a very
different purpose in mind. A particularly fine definition already had
been enacted in sections 8-201 and 8-202 of Maryland's
unemployment insurance law. 56 They read in pertinent part:
56. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8-201-202 (West 2007); see also § 8-205
(defining independent contractor). The original version both of sections 8-201 and 8-205
placed the burden of proof on the employer to prove that the worker is excluded from
coverage. See, e.g., Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Fox, 697 A.2d 478, 480 (Md.
1997).
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8-201. Covered Employment.
Except as otherwise provided. . . , employment is covered
employment if:
(1) regardless of whether the employment is based on the
common law relation of master and servant, the employment is
performed:
(i) for wages; or
(ii) under a contract of hire that is written or oral or express
or implied; and
(2) the employment is performed in accordance with § 8-202 of
this subtitle.
8-202. Location of Employment.
(b) Performance in State.-Employment that otherwise meets the
requirements of § 8-201 of this subtitle is covered employment if
the employment is:
57(1) performed in [this] State...
At the symposium from which this article is derived, I suggested
that similar language could be made applicable to all Maryland
legislation pertaining to labor and employment. In 2009, the General
Assembly took an important step in this direction, enacting the
Workplace Fraud Act of 2009.58 This bill creates both an
administrative enforcement mechanism and a private right of action,
including quadruple damages, against employers who misclassify
workers over whose work they exercise substantial direction and
control. Unfortunately, although it clarifies employment relationship
coverage for most of the state's labor and employment laws, the statute
applies only to a few industries-construction services and
landscaping services. Moreover, although it incorporates similar
provisions covering all industries for purposes of unemployment
benefits, 59 it weakens the prior definition, set forth above. It renders
the definition a mere presumption, rebuttable based on the
characterization of the work relationship by the Internal Revenue
57. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8-201-202 (West 2007). See also § 8-205 (West
2007) (defining independent contractor).
58. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-901-919 (West 2009); 2009 Md. ALS 188.
59. 2009 Md. ALS 188, amending MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8-201 and 8-205,
and inserting 8-201.1.
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Service as a contractual rather than an employment relationship. It
would have been preferable simply to adopt the prior unemployment
insurance statutory language to define workplace fraud.
If the legislature hereafter addresses the definition of
"employee" in a provision applying across all industries as well as
throughout the labor and employment code, it might do well to address
the definition of "employer" at the same time. Many statutes, both
state and federal, circularly define "employer" as anyone who employs
an employee, or, only slightly better, who employs an individual to
perform work. The resolution of the independent contractor-
employment relationship boundary line can be used to address labor
supply intermediaries and joint employment relationships. However, it
falls short of reaching the many situations in which the employer side
of the relationship is unclear because of how the party hiring the
performance of the work, always the core putative employer, has
structured the situation. The as-yet uninterpreted language of the
Workplace Fraud Act may actually contract the scope of coverage in
triangular employment situations, although undoubtedly that result
would be unintended. Section 20-801 of the State Government Article
makes aiding and abetting an employer in committing prohibited
discrimination a "violation," without specifying that the violation
renders the aider and abetter jointly and severally liable with the main
employer. Amending that provision to clarify this point, and adopting
similar language applicable across-the-board to labor and employment
law could provide a solution. It might minimize employer status issues
as corporations increasingly build "boundary-less" relationships with
their contractors, suppliers, and spun-off units performing component
work prior to the production of the final product or service.
Turning to the area of wages, it might be fruitful to
systematically examine the gender breakdown in Maryland of the
numerous categories of workers excluded from the Maryland Wage60
and Hour Law. The statute itemizes twelve excluded categories of
worker, followed by a separate exclusion for most agricultural labor.6'
Leaving aside the first clause, the remaining twelve listed exclusions
do not match those set forth under federal law. Several of these
categories seem relatively large and likely to be preponderantly
female. Section 3-403(a)(6), for example, excludes workers who are
"at least 62 years old and ... employed no more than 25 hours in a
week;" 3-403(a)(7) excludes immediate family members of the
60. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL., §§ 3-401-431 (West 2007).
6 1. Id. § 3-403.
WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
employer; 3-403(a)(10) excludes employees "engaged in canning,
freezing, packing, or first processing of perishable or seasonal fresh
fruits, vegetables, horticultural commodities, poultry, or seafood;" and
3-403(a)(12) excludes employees who sell "food and drink for
consumption on the premises" of a small (gross income of $250,000 or
less) caf6, restaurant, tavern, drugstore, or similar establishment.62
If these exclusions disproportionately exclude low wage
women workers, perhaps an effort should be undertaken to change
some of them. Likewise, one or two of the categories of employers
excluded under section 3-415 from overtime obligations seem to lack
any rational basis to justify the exclusion and would appear primarily
to exclude modestly paid women workers. 63 Section 3-415(b)(6)
excludes nonprofit entities which provide temporary at-home services
to aged or sick persons. Section 3-420(d) imposes a forty-eight hour
rather than forty hour work week before overtime rates become
payable for employees of bowling alleys and for employees of
residential institutions that care for the mentally ill, mentally retarded,
and others.64 If my surmise proves correct, the great majority of
workers performing these tasks are poorly paid women, often
immigrant workers or workers of color. An effort to restore overtime
coverage for their occupations would seem appropriate.
I would be remiss not to mention that Maryland's COMAR
regulations interpreting Section 3-403(a)(1), the exemption of
administrative, executive, and professional employees from overtime
coverage, still simply cross-reference the federal regulations defining
these terms under the Fair Labor Standards Act.65 This may have been
appropriate before the major overhaul of the federal regulations in
2004 by the Bush administration, 66 but the Maryland regulations now
no longer cross-reference what they previously had. This might be the
right time for the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation to
adopt its own regulations, perhaps reverting to the original language-
which worked well for several decades-but raising the dollar limits
appropriately. There are many heavily female job classifications
whose overtime coverage has been jeopardized by the Bush
administration's rewrite of these definitional regulations.
62. Id.
63. See id. § 3-415(b).
64. Id. §§ 3-415(b)(6), 3420(d).
65. MD. CODE REGS. §§ 09.12.41.01 (2001), 09.12.41.05 (2001), 09.12.41.17 (1984),
cross-referencing respectively 29 C.R.F. § 541.200 et seq., § 541.100 et seq., § 541.300 et seq.
66. The Bush administration regulations may be found at 69 Fed. Reg. 22122 (April 23,
2004), codifiedat 29 C.F.R. Part 541.
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As for the state statute prohibiting wage discrimination, a
modest amendment to Maryland's Equal Pay Law might be in order.
The law commences by announcing that it "applies to an employer of
both men and women in a lawful enterprise. This needlessly raises
questions about the viability of a worker's claim when she has
replaced a man and is being paid less, particularly if at that point all of
the workers are women. The sequential rather than simultaneous
comparator situation is well-established under the federal Equal Pay
Act.
686The Ledbetter case, 68 as discussed by Dr. Lovell,69 interpreting
time limits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, created an
untenable situation. Many victims of sex discrimination in pay,
particularly in the course of a series of pay raises, found themselves
time-barred from protesting the discriminatory elements in their initial
or early pay rates, while the employer's subsequent pay setting
mechanism relied on the previously set rate, thereby perpetuating the
effects of its own past discrimination into the present. Few women
would have the requisite information in time to file charges. Even
fewer would have the courage to risk their jobs early on, when the
wage differential may be very modest, even though percentage wage
increase formulas may cause the differential to snowball over the
course of a woman's career with one employer.
The perpetuation of its own past discrimination by the
employer was once recognized as a clear and present violation of
antidiscrimination law, particularly in the area of pay, where each new
paycheck had been held to constitute a new violation. 70 In Ledbetter,
however, the Supreme Court held that the initial discriminatory act of
setting pay differently because of the worker's sex triggered the
running of the statute of limitations. It was to be treated thereafter as
the functional equivalent of a lawfully established pay rate. This move
is remarkably similar to the Court's decision of 1989 in Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies,7 1 which That case held that a facially neutral
seniority system could not be challenged under Title VII on the basis
of its intentionally discriminatory adoption unless the charge was filed
within the time limits based on that original event, even though the
continued maintenance of the system perpetuated the sex
discrimination, occupational segregation and pay discrimination
67. MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-302 (West 2007).
68. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
69. Lovell, supra note 1, at 54-56.
70. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986).
71. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
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resulting from the original structure far into the future. In effect,
Lorance permanently insulated the discriminatory effects of such a
seniority system from challenge even by women hired into the system
far too late to have raised a timely challenge. Lorance was legislatively
overruled by Section 112 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; while this
article was in press, Congress similarly overturned Ledbetter, enacting
the Fair Pay Act.72
Marylanders need not depend solely on Congressional action,
however. Soon after enactment of the federal legislation, the Maryland
General Assembly adopted the Lilly Ledbetter Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 2009. Much like the federal law, the Maryland
legislation ensures that a claim for compensation discrimination
accrues with each discriminatory pay check. Addressing time limits
under the state anti-discrimination statute more generally, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has already displayed some reluctance in
interpreting Maryland's employment discrimination law to follow
some of the federal decisions giving an unduly crabbed construction to
time limits under Title VII. In its recent holding in Haas v. Lockheed
Martin Corp.74  the Court of Appeals interpreted the phrase
"occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act," in a case claiming
unlawful termination of employment. The question was whether the
event which would trigger accrual of the employee's cause of action
and the commencement of running of the statute of limitations 75 was
the actual cessation of the worker's employment, rather than the
employer giving the employee notice that he or she is to be discharged.
Rejecting the guidance of Delaware State College v. Ricks,76
and Chardon v. Fernandez,77  U.S. Supreme Court precedent
72. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79 (Nov. 21,
1991), codified as Section 706(e)(2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2007); Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5-6, amending Title VII by inserting
§ 706(e)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3). See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
(1994). The language overruling Lorance reads: "For purposes of this section, an unlawful
employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an
intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this title (whether or not that
discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision), when the seniority
system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a
person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or provision of the
system." § 2000e-5(e)(2). The language overruling Ledbetter is quoted supra note 37.
73. Lilly Ledbetter Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2009, 2009 Md. ALS 56 amending
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T, §§ 20-607, 20-608, 20-1009, 20-1012, 20-1013 (West 2009).
74. 914 A.2d 735 (2007).
75. The case was brought under the antidiscrimination provision of MONTGOMERY
COUNTY, MD. CODE § 27-19, so the two year statute of limitations provided for under Article
49B § 42(b)(1) was applicable. See Haas, 914 A.2d at 737, 739-42.
76. 449 U.S. 250 (1980). See also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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construing the analogous provision of Title VII in two cases involving
termination of academic employment, the Maryland Court of Appeals
pithily declared, "Put in a more homespun idiom, and paraphrasing a
frequent motherly admonition, 'Just because ,7 eorgia] ran off a cliff
doesn't mean [Maryland] has to follow suit."' The Haas opinion also
recited a lengthy list of examples of matters in which Maryland has
deliberately turned away from analogous precedent under a similar
federal law in favor of its own independent analysis.
79
The Court of Appeals criticized the Court of Special Appeals
for failing to start with the plain language of the Maryland law, which
was not identical to that of Title VII, instead of "relying on federal
decisional law construing Title VII as a surrogate for analysis of the
meaning of the terms used in the Maryland enactments." The
Maryland high court explained that "it is our duty to announce a rule
that we are convinced is best supported by sound jurisprudential policy
germane to the pursuit of legislative intent." 80 Nevertheless, the Court
of Appeals also relied on the remedial nature and purpose of
Maryland's employment discrimination law, and the maxim requiring
remedial statutes to be liberally construed.81 The court also relied on
the fact that triggering the limitations period upon notice when a
lengthy period elapses between then and the actual termination of
employment operates to frustrate the statutory scheme of conciliation,
and "propagates the filing of claims not yet ripe for adjudication. ' 82
These points, of course, are equally true as to Title VII. There is room
for some optimism that the Maryland state courts will similarly chart
their own course in analyzing time limits under Maryland law for
challenging other forms of sex discrimination.
There is one silver lining to the undue concentration of women
in jobs with small and medium size businesses. These businesses are
the least likely to have formal employee handbooks and manuals with
disclaimers of promises of job security. They are especially unlikely to
have unilaterally imposed an adhesion clause committing the
employee to binding arbitration of employment disputes, thus
displacing the worker's right to trial by jury under employment
discrimination and other labor and employment laws. However, the
majority of Maryland women are employed in medium and larger
77. 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam).
78. Haas, 914 A.2d at 743.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 749.
81. Id. at 750-51.
82. Id. at 751-52.
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businesses which can afford to employ attorneys to draft their
personnel policies and handbooks. Most of the larger businesses and
many of the medium-sized ones as well choose to include a provision
mandating binding arbitration as to all statutory, tort-based and
contractual disputes arising out of the employment relationship.
As Professor Eisenberg has suggested, the move from
courtroom and jury trial to arbitration is to the detriment of the
plaintiff employee in the majority of cases. 83 Academic studies are
somewhat mixed about whether employee win rates are higher or
lower in arbitration compared to courtroom litigation. It seems clear,
however, that the amount awarded by arbitrators tends to be
considerably lower than the amount awarded in jury verdicts.
Moreover, many of the arbitration clauses hamstring or entirely
preclude the possibility of class action litigation, even in the arbitral
forum. In addition, the arbitrator may not fully comply with statutory
law; whether arbitral awards are subject to judicial review and reversal
on grounds of statutory incompatibility is far from clear. Most awards
are not made public, and the decreasing availability of cutting edge
precedent further hampers the course of development of
antidiscrimination law.
State courts are constrained toward acceptance of "employment
contract" arbitration clauses by Supreme Court precedents interpreting
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)84 as applicable to unilaterally-
imposed, adhesion contract-like terms of employment. 85 Moreover,
Maryland has adopted the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, 86 which
thus far has been construed analogously to the FAA.
Arbitration agreements remain subject, however, to the normal
common law rules of the individual state regarding invalidation of
contracts or clauses based on contravention of public policy,
unconscionability, illusoriness of the consideration underlying the
contract, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and87
similar doctrines. There remains open, therefore, the opportunity for
the Maryland courts to insist upon minimum due process standards for
arbitration and other private dispute resolution systems internal to
83. Eisenberg, supra note 46 at 15-16.
84. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2007).
85. 1 use the term "employment contract" in the exceptionally loose fashion required by
United States Supreme Court precedent in this area. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
86. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-201-3-234 (LexisNexis 2007).
87. See Holloman v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 894 A.2d 547, 552-53 (Md. 2006); Cheek
v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 661 (Md. 2003).
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employment, consumer, and other contracts as a part of Maryland's
general corpus of contract law.
The Maryland courts should consider following the example
set by California and other states which have applied standards
sufficient at least to eliminate the most one-sided of the arbitration
schemes. Maryland courts should prevent employers from rendering
nugatory, through the device of a skewed dispute resolution procedure,
all of the protections provided for employees by the Maryland General
Assembly, along with any contractual promises made by the employer.
Should the courts fail to respond to this challenge appropriately, it
should be a high priority for state lawmaking, and eventually, one
hopes, federal amendment of the FAA as well. Otherwise, the
enforcement enhancement accomplished by last year's addition of a
private right of action, jury trials, and compensatory and punitive
damages to Maryland's employment discrimination law will be
rendered impotent in a great many cases.
Thus far, I have not suggested any major changes in
substantive law, only in coverage, exclusions, procedures, remedies,
and budgetary enforcement allocations. These would increase the
efficacy of legislative standards already adopted, promises made by
the state to women workers about their rights. These government
commitments have been partially honored in the breach for lack of
sufficient enforcement mechanisms to induce voluntary compliance by
most employers. The next set of ideas, on the other hand, is more
substantive in nature. As a result, they would entail building a broader,
stronger political coalition to win adoption. They might engender
greater resistance on the part of employers concerned about building in
higher labor costs and decreased flexibility in human resources
allocation and utilization. To break the seemingly intractable,
cumulative, and self-reinforcing labor market effects of occupational
segregation, devaluation of women's work, and in unintegrated jobs,
consistent job design at odds with the possibility of reconciling family
and work obligations in either the short or the long term, the higher
hurdles of deeper changes in law and employment practices may have
to be surmounted.
One place to start-indeed, an area where change is already in
process-is changing family and medical leave from unpaid to paid.88
This could be done through incorporation into the state unemployment
88. See the more detailed discussion of these developments in Hayes, supra note 20, at
28-29; NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, WHERE FAMILIES MATTER: STATE
PROGRESS TOWARD VALUING AMERICA'S FAMILIES (February 2007), available at
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/pdfs/Final%202006%20Round%2OUp.pdf.
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insurance benefits system, which would turn the fringe benefit into one
whose costs are partly spread throughout the state's employers. Other
options could include a statutorily mandated number of paid sick days
or family illness days per year per employee or alternatively, a
requirement that the employer permit workers to use paid sick or
vacation leave entitlements for family caretaking purposes. The latter
is the subject of the Flexible Leave Act, a bill passed in May 2008.89
The virtue of this option is that it is politically more modest, and hence
more readily attainable; the drawback is that it isolates the costs on
each employer, implicitly disincentivizing employers from hiring and
retaining in employment workers with family responsibilities or with
their own preexisting medical conditions. A different approach is to
prohibit discrimination based on family responsibilities. Careful
drafting would be necessary to ensure that this term is construed not to
mean family financial support obligations upon divorce, but caretaking
time commitment obligations. This approach, pioneered by the Center
for WorkLife Law in the U.S., has been attempted in European Union
countries, thus far without clear indications of success.
An alternative would be to increase the availability of family
and medical leave with assured rights to return to the job, enacting
Maryland legislation making leave more broadly available by reducing
the coverage threshold to employers with twenty-five or even fifteen
employees from the federal fifty employee threshold. Any state law
adopted along these lines should be drafted to be responsive to
litigation under the federal FMLA. It should clarify the employee's
right to take leave on the strength of her doctor's medical evidence. It
also should strengthen the employee's flexibility to take the leave
intermittently when appropriate in light of the worker's own health
condition. This job protection is particularly important when that
condition is a complicated pregnancy. Finally, the Maryland law
should more clearly maximize the employee's ability separately to
utilize any already existing entitlement she may have to employer-
provided paid sick leave benefits rather than permitting the employer
to compel the employee to count the use of her accrued paid sick leave
as part of her federal unpaid twelve week minimum.
90
89. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §3-802 (West 2009), 2008 Md. ALS 644, as
amended by 2009 Md. ALS 560. This statute covers employers with fifteen or more
employees, reaching significantly smaller employers than the FMLA.
90. A chart collecting the basics for each state on availability of unpaid leave are
collected in NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP OF WOMEN AND FAMILIES, STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO
UNPAID, JOB-PROTECTED FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS, available at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/StateunpaidFMLLaws.pdfdoclD=969.
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The first significant expansion of the FMLA took place after
this symposium, but before this volume went to press. 9' Rather than
being oriented toward improving work-family balance or women's
workplace situation in general, however, it was adopted to support and
facilitate military service and the families of service members. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200892 includes
two important expansions of the FMLA. First, employees who provide
care to a spouse, parent, child, or next of kin who becomes wounded or
seriously ill in the line of active military duty are entitled to a special,
one-time "service member family leave" of up to twenty-six weeks of
unpaid family leave within a twelve month period. Second, if the call-
up to active military duty of an immediate family member causes an
employee "any qualifying exigency," the employee is entitled to up to
twelve weeks of family leave.
98
Although aimed at a very specific situation, these are path-
breaking expansions of the FMLA. The addition of "next of kin," of
course, expands the scope of familial coverage for military-related
FMLA leave. This may set a precedent for similar expansion of FMLA
leave for more general purposes. Second, the maximum duration of
leave for an immediate family member caring for an injured member
of the armed services is more than doubled from twelve weeks to
twenty-six. Third, in the call-up situation, a new term has been
introduced, that of "a qualifying exigency." This phrase has been left
to the Department of Labor to define in regulations, and the provision
in which it is contained will not take effect until issuance of those
regulations. It is contemplated that the provision will be used to
address circumstances such as an employee taking leave in order to
care for a child when one of the child's parents, a covered relative of
the employee, has been suddenly called up for deployment overseas.
The recognition of the critical importance of family leave in
connection with military service highlights the need for broader
availability throughout the economy.
Perhaps as beneficial to women with family responsibilities as
enhanced family and medical leave or a prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of family responsibilities would be
something far simpler and politically more attainable: a flat ceiling on
working hours, or a prohibition against mandatory overtime, defined
not only as working more than eight hours in a day or forty in a week,
91. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181, 122
Stat. 3 (2008).
92. Id.
93. National Defense Authorization Act §§ 102(a)(I)(E), 102(a)(3).
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but working days and hours other than the worker's regularly defined
working time.
For many working women, the time and a half for overtime
formula established by the Fair Labor Standards Act94 had failed to
achieve its goals-spreading work more evenly through the economy
and financially incentivizing employers to avoid long and exhausting
working hours for employees-long before the Bush administration
regulations partially tore down the applicability of the overtime
provisions themselves. 95 The advent of payroll taxes and employee
fringe benefits has in more affluent workplaces pushed up the non-
wage costs of labor. Today it often is cheaper to pay two workers the
extra fifty percent on their wages and have them each work sixty hours
per week than it is to hire an additional employee to work forty hours
at the regular hourly rate.
Working women, and increasingly, working men as well, need
to be assured that they will be able to pick up their children from day
care at a set time, which mandatory, unscheduled overtime disrupts.
They also need legal assurance that their employment will not entail
sixty and seventy hour weeks when they would prefer to work fewer
hours, foregoing the overtime pay in favor of a better balance of
family and work life. There always will be some workers, particularly
younger workers who have yet to start a family, and empty nesters,
whose children have grown, who will be enthusiastic about the
opportunity to work longer and earn additional money. A voluntary
system coupled with reasonable compensation for the overtime work
can produce whatever degree of flexibility is needed by an employer
under normal operating conditions, without the coercion to work long
hours that forces women out of many jobs and career paths.
Maryland, by historical legacy of its blue laws, has retained a
statute ensuring that employees of retail businesses have the right to
one day's rest in seven, either "Sunday or the Sabbath of the
employee." 96 If an employer violates the law by forcing an employee
to work on the employee's designated day of rest, the employee has
the right to sue the employer for three times the employee's regular
rate of pay for each hour the employee works on her rest day.
97
However, employees in other types of establishments, as well as
managerial, professional, and (except in Wicomico County) part-time
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2007); see id. § 207.
95. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
96. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-704(b)(2) (West 2007). See Hayes, supra note
20, at 19.
97. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-704(c)(2) (West 2007).
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employees are excluded. 98 Simple extension of the right to one day off
per week for all employees, full-time or part-time, would be a
constructive start toward better work-family life balance.
Another very specific, tightly-focused Maryland law which
might become a model or itself be expanded to include other
occupations is contained in section 3-421. This statute at present
singles out for coverage only nurses. 99 It prohibits mandatory
overtime, defined as requiring "a nurse to work more than the
regularly scheduled hours according to the predetermined work
schedule."' 00 It does include narrowly drawn exceptions providing the
employer with some flexibility in emergency situations or when
confronted with a critical skill shortage. Nevertheless, this law assures
this overworked, primarily female labor force some control over their
departure time at the end of their shift in precisely the fashion which
would serve the need for regularity for many women workers in other
lines of work.
A different approach would be to increase social provision of
child and parental care, instead of relying on individual and family
efforts plus market forces to handle these societal necessities.
Expanding the use of public school facilities for after-hours day care
would help working parents of both sexes to juggle their paid market
employment with the needs of their children. Increased state subsidies
either directly to working families or to the service providers, aimed at
lowering the cost of both child care and parental care, also could ease
the pressure on working women personally to provide child or elder
care while somehow simultaneously putting in a full day's effort at
work. Alternatively, direct financial or tax subsidies or tax-favored
treatment could be provided to encourage employers to offer day care
and elder care as an employee fringe benefit. All of these approaches
together could begin to address the looming demographically-caused
skill shortage in numerous segments of the American economy as the
baby boom reaches retirement age. These proposed legislative changes
would encourage talented and able women workers to remain on the
job full-time rather than moving to part-time work or out of the labor
force entirely because of caretaking responsibilities.
The virtue of supporting child and elder care through paid labor
by non-family members is that, in the end, no law will wholly equalize
the career prospects of a worker who is available twenty hours per
week and one of comparable ability, skill and training who is available
98. Id. §§ 3-704(b)(2), 3-704(c)(I).
99. Id. § 3-421.
100. Id.
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sixty, at least when the work involves intellectual effort. Too much
learning occurs during job performance to permit workers to remain
level when working such different hours. Although some workers are
bright and clever enough to learn quickly and compensate, many are
not. Minimum labor standards that will preclude the worst forms of
discrimination based on workers' part-time, full-time, and super-time
status, rather than actual performance quality differences should be
coupled with affordable child and elder care. High quality, readily-
available dependant care would provide a meaningful choice to those
willing to compromise in favor of longer working hours and market
care, rather than shorter working hours, personal family care, and
lower income. This combined approach would in my view be the
optimal policy mix.
My personal preference for the next major legislative step is to
enact a statute requiring equality and nondiscrimination between full-
time and part-time employees, and between regular employees,
employed "permanently" (i.e., for the long-term) by the employer, and
contingent workers of all types. The term "contingent workers"
includes supposedly independent contractors who work directly for the
business, provided they are economically dependent upon the user of
their services in a manner sufficiently similar to that of a regular
employee. It also includes workers supplied by an intermediary so
long as they work on the labor user firm's premises under the
supervision of the user firm's management, under working conditions
controlled by the user firm. Such legislation would disincentivize
employers from using nonstandard and indirect forms of employment
as a means of undercutting the labor standards of its "regular" workers.
It would eliminate a major source of discrimination in compensation
for women workers, who are the great majority of part-timers and a
significant share of indirectly employed workers. Such legislation
would go hand in hand with the proposal to broaden the definition of
the employment relationship itself. The use of an equal
treatment/benchmark approach in novel situations is already under
experiment in Maryland in one narrow provision. Section 3-802
requires that if an employer provides leave with pay for its employees
following the birth of a child to the employee, then the employer must
provide the same leave with pay for an employee who adopts or
undertakes to provide foster care for a child.' 0 '
Finally, I will conclude with a few words about strategy. The
Maryland women's movement can proceed in either of two divergent
101. Id § 3-802.
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directions. It can start small and expand. For example, it could push
for leave of absence rights for victims of domestic violence, a narrow
category unlikely to impose substantial burdens on employers, hoping
later to expand to broader groups of workers. 102 Experience, however,
raises questions about the viability of this strategy in many situations.
Although deep and broad employer opposition is not mobilized, the
constituency energetically pressing for enactment is likely to be
narrow even among the women's movement. On the other hand, bold
legislative proposals can be advanced, mobilizing much broader
constituencies and more intensive support, although they must
overcome far more solid opposition from the employer side. Needless
to say, some employers also may be persuaded to join the effort to
enact a minimum labor standard, either because it serves their own
competitive advantage purposes, or because they take a longer view
about keeping a healthy and well-trained workforce in their own
business as well as in the larger state-wide labor market.
It is my view that proposals should be packaged, at a
minimum, broadly enough to appeal to a wide range of women, as well
as, on a gender neutral basis, to labor unions and other
nongovernmental organizations representing the interests of working
people. The Family and Medical Leave Act epitomizes this strategy. It
increases incentives to equalize burdens within the home through the
gender neutral nature of the family leave available. It legitimizes
family caretaking leave for those whose minds are still in the grip of
the traditional breadwinner model by assimilating it to the medical
leave for workers whose health condition renders them personally
unable to perform their jobs. Through these devices, the FMLA model
minimizes the employer tendency to view the additional employer
mandate as imposing extra costs exclusively, or predominantly for
women workers, thereby perversely discouraging employers from
hiring them, even if the law separately outlaws discrimination based
on gender, or based on family responsibilities. The FMLA approach
tends to break down rather than reinforce gender stereotypes both at
home and in the workplace. If the next generation is to come as long a
way as this one has, that is the path to tread.
102. See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 20, at 20-23.
